Abstract
ABSTRACT Recently, James Alexander has proposed a ‘dialectical definition’ of conservatism which, he believes, goes beyond ‘dispositional’ definitions, such as those proposed by Brennan and Hamlin, and by Martin Beckstein, which are ‘incomplete’.1 Alexander argues that, by focusing on conservative responses to ‘ruptures’ of continuity, his expanded account exposes the ‘fundamentally contradictory’ nature of conservative thought.2 This article offers a critique of Alexander’s ‘dialectical definition’ of conservatism, highlighting its inconsistency with the ideological content long agreed by conservative political thinkers, and with the historical realities of conservative political practice. But it also shows that there is a valuable and rightful place for a political ‘dialectic’ as part of a theory of conservatism that is more consistent with the history of conservative thought and practice. It is a dialectic with many historical precedents in political theory, two of which are examined in detail: (1) the earliest, found in Plato’s Statesman; and (2) an innovative and particularly useful formulation of it to be found in the political philosophy of R. G. Collingwood.
Highlights
James Alexander has proposed a ‘dialectical definition’ of conservatism which, he believes, goes beyond ‘dispositional’ definitions, such as those proposed by Brennan and Hamlin, and by Martin Beckstein, which are ‘incomplete’.1 Alexander argues that, by focusing on conservative responses to ‘ruptures’ of continuity, his expanded account exposes the ‘fundamentally contradictory’ nature of conservative thought.[2]
Accounts vary in the justifications they offer for such an orientation: it may be the belief that the status quo is worth defending; or it may be that the proposed innovation is likely to backfire, or will at least introduce hidden costs, perhaps due to an abundance of ignorance;[8] or it may reflect a general scepticism about our ability to understand political and social affairs in all their complexity, variety and diversity
Collingwood calls his attitude to politics ‘what in England is called democratic and on the Continent liberal’.55. He does not seem to consider himself a conservative. It is worth examining his version of this political dialectic in detail, because his framing of it in terms of ‘recruitment’ is very innovative, and because it can better accommodate much of the practical political and ideological history of conservatism from which we found Alexander’s theory to be rather distant
Summary
James Alexander has proposed a ‘dialectical definition’ of conservatism which, he believes, goes beyond ‘dispositional’ definitions, such as those proposed by Brennan and Hamlin, and by Martin Beckstein, which are ‘incomplete’.1 Alexander argues that, by focusing on conservative responses to ‘ruptures’ of continuity, his expanded account exposes the ‘fundamentally contradictory’ nature of conservative thought.[2]. There is one traditional referent of conservative thought in particular that is conspicuously absent from Alexander’s account and which, I think, cannot really be omitted from any political ideology, including conservatism.
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