The developmental state and economic policy in Turkey

Abstract

Most states of the Third World have shared a vision of where they would like to go, of how they hope their countries will appear in the future. The problem is getting there. What strategy should be employed? And who will implement it? Answers to these two questions are not straightforward. The interaction of state policy and the process of economic development is a complex one. Even if we can ® nd several features common to different countries, there is no universal and ahistoric model. The road each country takes is shaped by numerous factors speci® c to it. The choice and the sequences of the strategy are always constrained by available resources, the relative gains and losses that will be incurred by different classes and ideological factions, by the structures and social forces inherited from the past, by the country’ s regional and international position, interests and allies. We should also mention international markets and ® nancial ¯ ows, whose importance has been dramatically growing in the recent past. Finally, the state cannot implement all elements of a policy. It must rely on some other forces and agencies: domestic capitalist sector or foreign capital, for example. The choice of the development strategy is then constrained by the strengths and weaknesses of these (partially) external forces available to implement it. The autonomy of the state in developing countries with respect to domestic social classes and its sovereignty with respect to core developed countries and to international markets is also an open question. In some cases or stages of development, the state may be powerful and autonomous enough to choose the forces (agencies) to rely upon to implement its policies. But in some other cases or phases, forces (domestic or foreign) may impose themselves upon the state. A given development strategy may also set into motion a process that virtually creates new powerful class actors who ® nally dominate the state. The increasing strength of the Turkish bourgeoisie, emerging out of the decades of statist policies, is an excellent illustration of this phenomenon. Turkey also provides a good case to examine the points mentioned above. The developmental state experience is three quarters of a century long in this country. It is therefore possible to analyse the role of the state as an architect of structural transformation and its changing position in different stages of development. 1 The point of departure of the paper will be the emergence of the national state and the Turkish paradigm. Part three will be devoted to the 1950s, a period of rapidly