Abstract
When the US attempted to solve the Cyprus problem in 1964, it had no clear strategy. It did not care how to solve this family feud among NATO allies Greece and Turkey, but it regarded the union of the island with Greece, with some concessions to Turkey, as the most feasible way. Nevertheless, as US diplomats regarded Cyprus as a Greek-Turkish problem, rather than an independent country, and as they failed to understand how Cyprus could be of a higher priority for the countries directly concerned than the overall containment of Communism, they had to realize the limits of American power within a protracted, social conflict.
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