Abstract

In two experimental studies, we investigated the affective (Studies 1 and 2) and behavioral (Study 2) effects of not being trusted. In an adapted version of the Trust Game paradigm, participants were all assigned the position of Person B, and learned that their opponent (Person A) had decided to not let them divide monetary outcomes. This had either been an inactive decision (Person A had not offered them the option to distribute outcomes) or an active decision (Person A had taken away their option to distribute outcomes). Results of both studies reveal that reactions to not being trusted were significantly affected by whether this decision was active or inactive. Active decisions evoked a more negative evaluation toward Person A, led participants to experience more negative emotions, and lowered their satisfaction with the final outcome, even though payoffs and final earnings were held constant between the conditions (Study 1). In addition, when the decision not to trust had been an active decision, participants subsequently behaved less altruistic, as evidenced by significant lower allocations in a subsequent Dictator Game (Study 2). Interestingly, this reduction in altruism was not restricted to encounters with Person A, but also extended to an uninvolved other (Person C).

Highlights

  • Trust is essential in many facets of our daily lives

  • We presented half of our participants with a Dictator Game (DG) in which they were not connected to Person A, but instead to a Person C, who had not in any way been involved in the previous Trust Game (TG) setting

  • By adding a subsequent DG, we investigated whether the effects of not being trusted would go beyond affective responses (Study 1)

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Summary

Introduction

Trust is essential in many facets of our daily lives. This importance is evident in trust between family members or friends, and in trust within economic settings. The importance of trust for societies has been widely acknowledged in the economic literature (e.g., Fukuyama, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Uslaner, 2000; Zak and Knack, 2001; Dincer and Uslaner, 2010). This literature reveals the benefits of trust in economic situations (such as economic growth), and argues that low levels of trust lead to economic stagnation (such as lowered cooperation; e.g., Bijlsma-Frankema et al, 2015).

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