THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS ON THE RATES OF LUGGAGE THEFT IN RAILWAY AND UNDERGROUND STATIONS

Abstract

The study reported here considers the deterrent effect of terrorist incidents on the rates of luggage theft in railway and underground stations. We selected for our task a well-publicized major terrorist incident that took place on 18 February 1991. The analysis of the data shows that in the periods immediately following the terrorist incident there was a sharp but short-lasting decline in the number of cases of luggage theft. This indicates that either increased police vigilance, or the fear of potential thieves that items of luggage might contain explosives, produces a definite if short dived deterrent effect. One of the most debated and controversial issues in modern criminal justice policy is that of general deterrence, i.e. the inhibiting effects of sanctions on the illegal activity of potential criminals. (Zimring and Hawkins 1973; Beyleveld 1979, 1980; Tittle 1980; Walker 1991). The underlying assumption of general deterrence theory and associated policy is that individuals calculate the risk involved in criminal activity and refrain from it, because of their fear of punishment. Used in this sense, deterrence assumes a rational calculation of benefits and risks, including the probability of detection as well as the severity and swiftness of punishment by the potential offender. Indeed, utilitarian writers and economic and modern classical theorists argue that the purpose of criminal justice is to create an organized system of official threats sufficient to outweigh the perceived benefits of committing a crime (Bentham 1789; Posner 1985; Walker 1991). Opponents of the validity of the concept of general deterrence, on the other hand, dispute the thesis that potential criminals calculate risks in a rational manner and reject the view that the perception of the danger that they will be apprehended and punished for their misbehaviour has any significant deterrent effect. They argue that people tend to commit offences almost irrespective of the risk involved.1 The identification and measurement of deterrence are notoriously difficult for researchers, because of the methodological and ethical problems involved. As Ash worth points out, satisfactory empirical evidence is difficult to obtain since 'the condi tions must be such that non-offending can safely be ascribed to the deterrent effect of the sanction rather than other factors' (Ashworth 1994).