The Determinants of Insider Trading in the Credit Default Swap Market -A Network Perspective

Abstract

This study investigates whether and how insider trading in the credit default swap (CDS) market is influenced by the corporate board network, formed by interlocking boards. We find strong evidence that firms with a more centralized position in the board network experience a higher degree of insider trading in the CDS market. Our results suggest that the board network facilitates private information leakage to investors, resulting in more active informed trading in the CDS market. Moreover, such an association is more pronounced for firms with negative earnings news and for firms with weak corporate governance. In addition, using the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) as a quasi-natural experiment, we document that insider trading becomes less active after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. Our results still hold when we run our analysis using four centrality measures separately or when controlling for the number of banking relationships.