The determinants of informal housing price in Beijing: Village power, informal institutions, and property security

Abstract

Although the how's of the informal housing market in China has been discussed widely; the answers remain conflicted. Using the theory of new institutional economics, this paper aims to answer two questions: what informal institutions secure the de facto tenure and facilitate the market? and How do informal institutions affect the pricing mechanism? We propose a conceptual framework to investigate the links between informal institutions, de facto tenure, and the price of informal housing. It is argued that villages have the ability to seek political patronage and regulate the market transactions to secure the tenure of informal housing. This ability is authorized by several formalities: the dual land system and the regime of village autonomy. The growing powers of market agencies in local development help strengthen the village's ability. The variances in ability between villages lead to a heterogeneity of tenure security, thus creating price differentials in the market. A higher tenure security increases the housing price. In conclusion, the informal housing market in China is “regulated” by a “semi-formal” system in which both informality and formality work and intertwine. A robust pricing mechanism has been emerging within the context of transition.