Abstract
AbstractThis article focuses on problems of institutional design from a political perspective. It examines the problems of agentification using a principal–agent framework, and attempts to explain the choices made between problems of commitment and problems of agency. The fundamental problem addressed is the degree of autonomy possible within a broader framework of political control of policy. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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