Abstract
Magnet schools are an attempt to introduce market incentives into school desegregation policy. The analyses presented here assess the extent to which they have improved the effectiveness of desegregation plans in a 600-school-district national sample from 1968 to 1991. I find that adding magnet schools to a voluntary plan does not seem to produce any more interracial exposure than does a voluntary plan without magnets. Moreover, there are diminishing marginal returns to magnets. The greater the percentage of magnets in a voluntary desegregation plan, the greater the white flight and the less the gain in interracial exposure. The effectiveness of magnets also varies by structure.
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