Abstract
:Using an analysis of cement and sugar/sweeter trade disputes between Mexico and the U.S. within the North American Free Trade Aagreement (NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), the article argues that retention of trade remedies sanctions in these agreements attempts to mediate and externalize conflicting interests between those economic actors that seek to reproduce their existing economic power position within a nation-state and those that are more integrated with the global economy via trade and investment. At the same time, dispute settlement mechanisms within NAFTA and the WTO allow nation-states to appear to defend the national economic interest even as they lock-in market discipline and favor the interests of large corporations across state boundaries.
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