The Democratic Cost of Consecutive Re-election and Presidential Term-Limit Evasion in Latin America

Karel Kouba,Jan Pumr

doi:10.1017/gov.2021.51

Abstract

AbstractDespite theoretical arguments suggesting the strong effects of presidential term limits and re-election on democracy, there is surprisingly little empirical evidence to evaluate them. We test both the effect on democracy of the existence of a consecutive re-election rule and of reforms introducing it for incumbent presidents. Using evidence from Latin American countries between 1945 and 2018, we test their relationship to both vertical and horizontal accountability. A synthetic control method is employed to account for the effect of term-limit reforms, and time-series cross-section models for modelling the association with the re-election rule. Both vertical and horizontal accountability as well as the quality of democracy are eroded by term-limit evasion reforms in most countries and strengthened in none between 1990 and 2018. Allowing presidents to run for re-election – relative to term-limited ones – is consistently associated with weak democratic outcomes.

Highlights

Despite theoretical arguments suggesting the strong effects of presidential term limits and re-election on democracy, there is surprisingly little empirical evidence to evaluate them
Does the scrapping of term limits by presidents to allow their immediate re-election cause the quality of democracy to decline? Does having a president who is eligible for immediate re-election cause the quality of democracy to deteriorate? This analysis attempts to answer both questions in a comparative perspective of Latin American countries between 1945 and 2018
Our goal in this article is twofold. We study both the effect on the quality of democracy of having a president who is not bound by term limits and of the introduction of a reform that allows him or her to stand for immediate re-election

Summary

Introduction

Despite theoretical arguments suggesting the strong effects of presidential term limits and re-election on democracy, there is surprisingly little empirical evidence to evaluate them. The treated units constitute 197 cases of country-years in which presidents were in office who did not face a term limit and were eligible for a consecutive re-election.

Results

Conclusion