The Demise of the Soviet Communist Party. BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies, 41 by Atsushi Ogushi (review)

Abstract

REVIEWS 781 entered intoforce on 1January 1997).Itisrather surprising tosee thisvolume in theBASEES series. Pennsylvania StateUniversity University ofLondon(emeritus) W. E. Butler Ogushi,Atsushi.TheDemise ofthe Soviet Communist Party. BASEES/Routledge Serieson Russianand East European Studies,41. Routledge,London andNewYork,2008.xvi+ 218pp. Tables. Figures. Notes.Bibliography. Index.£75.00. The collapseoftheCommunist PartyoftheSovietUnion (CPSU) enabled thedestruction oftheSovietUnionbutsurprisingly little has beenwritten on theinstitutional aspectsoftheCPSU's declineand fall.Atsushi Ogushi'sstudy oftheinternal politics oftheCPSU's collapseis therefore to be welcomedas an additionto a smallbutimportant literature. Ogushiconcentrates on the reorganization of CentralCommitteedepartments and commissions from 1988,thefailure toreform theparty through theelections to,and meeting of, the 28thCPSU Congressin 1990,the collapseof theparty'sfinancialand membership base,and theCPSU's declining control oversecurity agenciesin itslastyearsand howthisshapedtheeventsofAugust1991.These are areas thatpreviousstudiesof the CPSU's collapse have sometimes touchedon but theyhave not providedas much detailas Ogushi does. This detailed description ofpartyorganizational matters is thebook'sgreatest strength. Ogushi's argument is thatpartyreform began as an effort to improve partyworkand stoppartyleadersfromactingas khoziastvenniki (economic managers). Reforms faileddue to poor leadershipand implementation, and theremovalofthepartyfromeconomicmanagement caused whatOgushi callsa powervacuum.The partydid notrefill thisvacuumby becominga politicalpartyas theelectionsand eventsof the 28thCongressshow.The party'sability to deal withthisvacuumwas hamperedby a financial crisis createdbyfalling party membership and thedevolution ofcontrol overparty property. In thisvacuumtheSovietleadership became moredependenton security forces buthad lesscontrolovertheseforces. As thecrisisdeepened thesecurity forcestriedto reassert controlas a praetorian guardbut failed and infailing sealedthefateoftheparty. In addition tothisargument Ogushi discussesin the introduction and conclusionhow far the collapse of the CPSU is comparableto othercases of rulingCommunistpartycollapse and whatthe CPSU's demisetellsus about theories of Sovietpoliticsand democratization. OverallthelineofOgushi'sargument aboutthedemiseoftheCPSU and howitscollapseplayedintothewidercollapseoftheUSSR isplausible.I am notsure,however, thattheargument isalwaysborneoutbytheevidencethat Ogushipresents, or thatthewidertheoretical pointsthathe makesare fully convincing. This is because of what Ogushi omits,because of the nature of the evidencethathe looksat, and because of the poor specification of 782 SEER, 88, 4, OCTOBER 2OIO hypotheses and concepts.What Ogushi omitsis the impactof the wider politicalchangesthatoccurredbetween1988and 1991.He mentions events suchas theelectionsof 1989and 1990but does notconsiderin any depth whatinfluence theyhad on theCPSU and itscadres,or try tomeasurewhat influence theyhad on the end of the USSR so as to estimatethe role of partycollapseindependently ofthem.It is clear thatinternal partyconflict and confusion werenecessary conditions forSovietsystemic failure but not thatthey weresufficient to cause thesystemic failure or eventhedispersal of powerthatprecededit.A knock-on effect ofthisisthatOgushidoesnotmake a completely convincingcase that lookingat the party'sorganizational problems helpsus to evaluateideas about Sovietcollapsesuchas mightbe derivedfrommodernization theoryor transitology. This latterproblemis exacerbated bythevery reductive approachthatOgushiuseswhensummarizingarguments made by institutionalists, modernization theorists and transitologists , and the simplification of conceptsused to supporthis argument. The hypotheses hededucesfrom themaintheoretical positions hetests against theparty's collapseareverycrudedistillations ofthearguments theseschools present. A similar problemariseswhennewconcepts areintroduced throughout thebook: generally theyare not well definedor thoroughly discussed. Ogushi'suseofpraetorianism inthechapter on theAugust coup,forexample, is a verysimplerendition of the originalHuntingtonian idea: Huntington talkedofat leastfourtypesofpraetorianism but Ogushiuses it straightforwardlyas beliefin theneed formilitary /policerule.In a shortbook (some 167pagesofactualtext)somemoretimespenton conceptualand hypothesis definition wouldnothave gone amissand mighthave helpedto strengthen thepurchaseoftheanalysis moregenerally. The theoretical partsof Ogushi'sbook are thusnot as successful as the empirical description ofpartyreorganization, elections to the28thCongress andfinancial decline.Stillhisbookisa detailedcontribution on thesefeatures oflateCommunist ruleand willbe ofgreatuse to specialists forthatreason and forthelight thatitthrows on thelaterstagesofGorbachev's reforms and thecentrality oftheCPSU to their failure. Department ofPolitics andPublicAdministration University ofLimerick Neil Robinson Grachev, Andrei. Gorbachev's Gamble:Soviet Foreign Policyand theEnd oftheCold War.PolityPress,Cambridgeand Maiden, MA, 2008. xiii + 271pp. Notes.Bibliography. Index.£20.00. Andrei Grachev, who workedon foreign policyin MikhailGorbachev's team,offers an insider's viewofthetwists and turns ofitsmaking. He setsout to contribute whathe dubs'a morestereoscopic image'(p. 8) bydrawing on thetestimonies ofotherinsiders, keyfunctionaries and politicalplayers.His bookis a hugely welcomeadditionto theliterature drawing on theviewsof thosein theparty, ministries, military, secret policeand academia,as wellas on theopinionsofforeign leaders. ...