Abstract

This paper contributes to the discussion of the moral demandingness of Kantian ethics by critically discussing an argument that is currently popular among Kantians. The argument from the system of duties holds that (a) in the Kantian system of duties the demandingness of our duty of beneficence is internally moderated by other moral prescriptions, such as the indirect duty to secure happiness, duties to oneself and special obligations. Furthermore, proponents of this argument claim (b) that via these prescriptions Kant’s system of duties incorporates into morality what current debates on (over-)demandingness call happiness and personal projects. These two claims are in conjunction supposed to establish that Kant’s ethics, at least when it comes to beneficence, is not plagued by the problem of excessive moral demands. We show that claims (a) and (b) are mistaken given what Kant says about beneficence, the application of imperfect duties and about emergencies. We finally argue that special obligations towards loved ones, a class of obligations largely overlooked by advocates of the system of duties, are the most promising candidates for internal moderation. These duties are, however, of a narrow scope.

Highlights

  • This paper contributes to the discussion of the moral demandingness of Kantian ethics by critically discussing an argument that is currently popular among Kantians

  • We will critically assess a strategy recently advocated by a number of Kantians who assume that the main source of potential excessive moral demandingness is our duty of beneficence, especially with regard to the globally poor[2], and who argue that the demands of beneficence to the poor are moderated by other moral prescriptions

  • The Kantian system of duties is more demanding than proponents of the argument from the system of duties believe, and we have one reason less to believe that Consequentialism is much more demanding than Kantian moral theory

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Summary

Kant on Demandingness and the Argument from the System of Duties

We will show that it is textually warranted to confront Kant with the problem that his theory might be too demanding. It merely means that there are fewer options for complying with them This might make the fulfilment of our imperfect duties even more demanding, since some easy options (such as lying in order to save a person from a murderer looking for his victim) might be ruled out as violations of more stringent duties.[9] it should go without saying that the prohibition of suicide is perfectly compatible with a highly demanding ethics that requires living a life hardly worth living. It should be noted that Kantians sometimes point out that technically we do not have duties to others, since all our duties are owed to our rational self (see VI:388.24-5, 417.5-418.23) This means that “no one else has a right to require me that I sacrifice my ends if these are not immoral” (ibid.38824-5), and that others cannot complain (blame me, demand reparation, etc.) if I refuse to help them. The question of how much morality requires of me remains an important one, though it is not one that is necessarily answered in the language of rights

Balancing Obligatory Ends
The indirect duty to secure happiness
24 There is of course still some latitude even in this situation
28 There is an additional problem here
The imperfect duty to develop one’s talents
Special Obligations
Conclusion
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