The Decline of Regular Order in Appropriations: Does It Matter?

Abstract

This paper examines trends in the procedural fiscal performance of Congress and the president. It evaluates several hypotheses about why the regular order in Congressional budgeting and appropriations has fallen into disuse. While the question has many angles and dimensions, I consider three aspects. First, I consider changes in the use of presidential budgets and congressional budget resolutions. When do presidents make their proposals? Do the House and Senate pass and reconcile resolutions? Then I consider the timing of the passage of appropriations bills and the use of continuing resolutions. Why is Congress more frequently tardy in passing appropriations and to what extent have continuing resolutions and omnibus bills become a substitute for the traditional stand-alone appropriations.Finally, I take up the question of the extent to which the decline of regular order has affected fiscal outcomes. Has the more irregular process undermined the ability of Congress and the President to manage the government's finances? Has it created more policy uncertainty that detracts from government performance and spooks private economic actors?