The Decision Process of the Trusteeship in Korea, 1945–1946: Focusing on the Change of U.S. Ideas

Abstract

The U.S. decision to enact Trusteeship of Korea after the liberation in 1945 was a prelude of a tragedy in Korean contemporary history, which extended to the separation of the peninsula. Both the U.S. and the USSR had no reason to hasten the independence or unification of Korea. They needed “to stay in Korea” for more influence in Korea, without engendering blame for imperialist rule or anti‐colonial resistance. The American plan and Russian approval on the trusteeship in Korea was the best choice to secure sharing a portion of Korea in the name of international trusteeship. This would exempt them from the danger of dominance by one power in Korea. From the U.S. point of view, such a trusteeship system would delay Korean independence, but would have the virtue both of acknowledging the Soviet interest in Korea and of hamstringing and confining Moscow's expansionist impulses. Furthermore, the divided occupancy was the only co‐factor that satisfied the interests of both the Soviet Union and the U.S. The Soviet Union was determined to establish a Soviet‐friendly country in the Korean peninsula, while the U.S. wanted a buffer zone against the spread of the Cold War with the Soviet Union. Trusteeship was impossible to implement until both countries could totally agree on the issues, which meant the trusteeship was impossible from the start. After the death of American President F. D. Roosevelt, the Truman Administration was initially willing to abolish the trusteeship as long as America did not lose dominance in Korea. However, the U.S. could not explicitly publicize this idea, because they wanted to eschew any accusations of being a promise breaker.