The Decarbonization Bargain: How the Decarbonizable Sector Shapes Climate Politics

Abstract

Political scientists conceptualize climate politics as a distributive struggle between emerging green and incumbent fossil coalitions. We argue that, even though this conceptualization is historically accurate, a dichotomous understanding no longer fully explains conflicts over climate policy. Importantly, it misses a group of industries that are central to recent policy progress: the decarbonizable sector. Decarbonizable industries, such as automakers or energy-intensive manufacturers, have long been part of fossil coalitions but can develop new sources of competitiveness through decarbonization. This makes them receptive to a bargain: agreeing to meet climate goals in exchange for policies that support their decarbonization, especially fiscal policies that partially fund or de-risk their business transitions. We establish this argument using an original measurement of the size of the decarbonizable sector and corroborate our findings through case studies of green spending policies in the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom.