Abstract

In ‘When Does a Human Being Die?’ Schofield et al . 1 present a definition of death focused on the ‘final denouement’ of human beings as biological organisms. Their view is such that the moment of death occurs ‘when the last process in the collection of bodily processes that maintain homoeostasis finally cease[s]’.1 Whilst this definition avoids certain conceptual problems there are difficulties with this view. Not least that its acceptance would mean placing death at a much later point than is commonly presumed. Arguably what is on offer is the modern equivalent of what Dungson had to say in 1833: ‘the only certain sign of real death is the commencement of putrefaction’.2 Were this account to be adopted it would clearly require significant revision to our ordinary understanding of death. In addition, we might consider if this ‘organismic’ and ‘denouement’ conception is of any practical use. The concern is similar to that expressed by Bernat3 regarding ‘higher’ formulations of brain death: ‘By declaring patients dead who are regarded as alive in every society and culture, it contrives a redefinition of death’. Schofield et al . offer such a contrivance, one that means not declaring dead certain patients who are commonly regarded as such. Thus, despite the title of their article, there is little to connect Schofield et al . ’s definition of death to particular human beings as opposed to specific human organisms . Whilst some approaches to death can be criticised for being overly focused on the …

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