The Death of Detente?

Abstract

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan signified the end of an era in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. The superpowers, having been on a collision course for a number of years, had become so mutually disillusioned that the crisis over Afghanistan was probably perceived as a blessing of sorts by a number of officials in both Washington and Moscow. After prolonged suffering, the patient known as detente had finally passed away, and there would be no need for further artificial life support treatment. In the United States, an influential school of thought clearly felt that if the Soviet fraternal aggression against Afghanistan had not happened, it would have had to be invented to provide the last straw to break detente's back. And there is evidence that there was joy among some Soviet elite circles at the break as well. The world became wonderfully simple once again-us against them, good guys against bad guys. Ironically, a number of statements coming from the U.S. and Soviet capitals in the aftermath of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan appear to be almost interchangeable in their self-righteousness and rhetorical overkill. Both sides talk about Afghanistan as a watershed and as representing a qualitative change in each other's policies. Both pledge toughness and proclaim that they are not going to be pushed around. Their respective pronouncements are more of an effort to influence the West Europeans and the third world than an exercise in bilateral diplomacy. In a way, leaders of the United States and the USSR almost talk through rather than to each other. Spokesmen of both nations voice grave pessimism regarding prospects for the U.S.-Soviet relationship in the years to come. Prophecies of doom and gloom are contending for the status of a new foreign policy orthodoxy among the Russians and Americans alike. Did it have to be this way? Did the Soviet world outlook and modus operandi amount to a prediction of detente's collapse from the very beginning? Was detente a skillful Kremlin ploy to seduce naive Westerners into complacency? Or was it a willing self-deception on the part of the West, especially the United States, looking for a convenient excuse to withdraw from a rough game of geopolitical maneuvering for influence and resources? On the other hand, could it be that there existed an element of genuine Soviet commitment to rapprochement with the United States, which, if exploited by American