The dance of person and place: one interpretation of American Indian philosophy

Abstract

The aim of this book is to demonstrate that American Indians have a worldview that is consistent, intelligible, and legitimate. It is a deft and self-aware exemplification of the task of cross-cultural comparison. The overall strategy in the argument is to employ a modified version of Nelson Goodman’s notion of world-making and then construct a simplified model of the American Indian worldview. Norton-Smith accomplishes this difficult task and in the process modifies Goodman in a realist direction, making a strong case that the Native view deserves intellectual respect. The writing is accessible and shows a deft and helpful interplay between abstract language and concrete illustrative material. He opens with an argument for the use of the label “American Indian,” rather than “Native American” or “Indigenous.” He then points out that there is no single American Indian philosophy. Nevertheless, there are some common themes that are found across various American Indian cultures. Other interpreters might select a different set of themes, so this is one possible interpretation. Further, if philosophy is a distinct discipline, there is no analogue to it in American Indian culture. Yet ontological, epistemological, and axiological beliefs and actions abound in Native world versions. Norton-Smith recognizes two challenges to his project. First, the sources for examining American Indian thought are unreliable. Older sources— linguistic studies, ethnographies, anthropological and archeological theories— are mainly filtered through Western eyes. Black Elk Speaks is an example. Newer accounts by Native writers lack a depth of knowledge of tribal traditions. The second challenge is that any translation of Native thought forms into Western language cannot do full justice to the original version. Thus, the best we can hope for is one possible rational reconstruction of a Native philosophy. Chapter 2 sets forth Nelson Goodman’s constructivist view that “there is a plurality of internally consistent, equally privileged, well-made actual