Abstract

Abstract This chapter begins by describing the current state of prediction science, which is improving but is still almost as likely to produce inaccurate judgments as accurate ones. It also makes the crucial distinction between clinical prediction testimony and prediction testimony based on empirically derived probability estimates (which includes not only actuarial prediction testimony but might also encompass testimony based on what has come to be called “structured professional judgment”). The chapter then canvasses judicial decisions concerning the admissibility of prediction testimony, decisions that, despite the high error rates associated with predictions, are even more welcoming than the decisions dealing with expert opinions about culpability. Finally, it presents an evidentiary analysis of prediction testimony with an assessment of its materiality, a concept that raises particularly interesting issues in connection with prediction testimony based on group data and demographic information.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call