The Cuban Rebel Army: A Numerical Survey

Abstract

Few events in modern Latin American history have received as much attention from historians and social scientists as the Cuban Revolution. In scholarly books and articles they have described, discussed, and analyzed the manner in which the revolutionary government came to power in January 1959. These authorities agree that the guerrilla campaign waged by Fidel Castro contributed to the overthrow of the government of President Fulgencio Batista, but opinions differ as to the relative importance of rural insurgency, urban terrorism, and counter terrorism. Informed judgments supposedly are based on some knowledge of the extent of the guerrilla campaign in rural Cuba. An indicator of the extent of guerrilla activity is the number of persons involved in it. But there is wide disagreement as to the maximum numerical strength of the rebel army of the 26 of July Movement. Table I provides a composite sampling of estimates by Cuban sources and by non-Cuban scholars. Obviously, some writers must be mistaken about an essential fact of the Cuban Revolution. Based on factual error, their analyses are hardly reliable. In the case of a momentous event like the Cuban Revolution, wrong interpretations can work great mischief. After twenty years, the time has come to set the record straight. Among those who have estimated total Fidelista strength, the best informed would appear to be the rebel army's Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro Ruz. However, on different occasions Fidel gave widely divergent figures (Table I, Items 6 and 7). In judging the accuracy of each figure, the concurrent political and military situation must be taken into account. Prior to the fall of the Batista government, Fidel is known to have exaggerated the size of his forces for tactical reasons. In February 1957 he sought to deceive the New York Times' Herbert L.