Abstract
Although the details of the Cuban missile crisis have been told countless times, relations between the United States and France figure minimally in most accounts. Most scholars view Charles de Gaulle’s reaction as a derivative of a classic balance of power axiom about alliances that during times of crisis between the US and the Soviet Union, France was a firm ally, while in times of decreased superpower tension, France sought independence from American dominance. Other historians regard de Gaulle’s irritation over lack of tripartite consultation as standard reflex. The problem with both conclusions is that scholars mistakenly dismiss de Gaulle’s foreign policy demands as “sound and fury” about being informed rather than consulted. By dwelling on France’s exclusion from the process of Western nuclear decision-making, scholars have perpetuated the myth of tripartism and neglected de Gaulle’s substantive concerns.2
Submitted Version (
Free)
Published Version
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
