THE CRITIQUE OF MILL’S UTILITARIANISM CONCERNING VIRTUE

Abstract

Utilitarianism is based on the idea that human beings are inclined to increase pleasure and avoid pain. Although Mill agrees with this idea, he makes a distinction between higher and lower pleasures. This distinction is made considering the quality of pleasures rather than their quantity. Higher pleasures are the ones we have as a result of the employment of higher faculties. As opposed to that, lower pleasures mostly come as a result of satisfying bodily desires. Mill argues that those who are acquainted with both prefer higher pleasures over the lower pleasures. According to Mill, virtue is one of the things which bring out higher pleasures. It means that exercising virtues gives one higher pleasure and it is more valuable than other kinds of pleasure. This is why virtue is desired and considered valuable. This view is subjected to strong criticisms. In this study, some of those criticisms will be analyzed and it will be argued that although Mill’s account can be defended against some of them, it leads to a contradiction. It will also be argued that this contradiction is caused by Mill’s desire to give an empirical explanation for virtue and his account has a problem with providing an epistemological foundation for it.