The criminalization of money laundering and terrorism in global contexts: a hybrid solution

Abstract

What obligations do global actors have to prevent terrorism? Is consent required to create an international obligation, or does the correctness of its goals ground its legitimacy? In this paper, I consider these questions with respect to a subset of international law often overlooked: anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). AML/CFT comprises peaceful response to violence and terrorism, making it a significant component of international justice and diplomacy. First, I present the current legal framework for AML/CFT institutions and identify two conflicting sources of justification: objective value and consent. The fix for this problem, I argue, does not come from either component alone. Objective value cannot provide the sole source of justification because it cannot settle the choice between multiple competing norms that would achieve the same objective goods were we to follow them (‘the choice problem’). Consent cannot provide the sole source of justification (‘the constraint problem’) for two reasons: some contracts that people agree to are morally abhorrent and others are morally required but people do not agree to them. But objective value and consent can be combined consistently, and I articulate this hybrid as a sound basis for evaluating and reforming AML/CFT laws and institutions.