The Credibility of America's Extended Nuclear Deterrent: The Case of the Republic of Turkey

Abstract

Abstract : In 2009 the United States completed an 80 percent reduction of its operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons from Cold War highs. Since 1991 the United States has also reduced its nonstrategic nuclear weapons by over 90 percent. Additionally, the United States removed much of its nuclear arsenal from alert status and continues to decrease its nuclear weapons stockpiles. However, nuclear weapons may still play an important role in deterring an adversary attack against the United States as well as providing a nuclear umbrella to allies. An extended nuclear deterrent for protecting allies may also contribute significantly to nonproliferation efforts- the nuclear umbrella provides allies an assurance so they do not perceive the need to develop nuclear weapons arsenals for themselves. This study explores the impact of US nuclear weapon policy on the current and future effectiveness of extended nuclear deterrence for the Republic of Turkey. It concludes that the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence for Turkey depends on many factors and not just the quality and quantity of the US nuclear arsenal.