The Court Should Have Remained Silent: Why the Court Erred in Deciding Dickerson v. United States

Abstract

The Supreme Court's decision in Dickerson v. United States' will be most remembered for its emphatic reaffirmation of Miranda v. Arizona.2 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in a seven to two decision in Dickerson, declared: We do not think there is such justification for overruling Miranda. Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture.3 Dickerson also will be remembered, especially by students of constitutional law and the federal court system, for its importance in defining the relationship between Congress and the Supreme Court in the area of constitutional remedies. The issue before the Court in Dickerson was the constitutionality of a federal statute, 18 U.S.C. ? 3501, which sought to overrule Miranda v. Arizona. Adopted as part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, ? 3501 provided that confessions shall be admissible in federal court so long as they are voluntary.4 The statute declares: In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a confession . . . shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given.5 The statute's goal, as the Court observed in Dickerson, was to overrule