The Costs of U.S. Hegemony: Military Power, Military Spending, and U.S. Trade Performance

Abstract

For David Gordon and his collaborators in the social structures of accumulation (SSA) tradition, the willingness to threaten potential adversaries with military forces capable of acting on a global scale was seen to positively affect the U.S. terms of trade. U.S. hegemony yielded specific supply side benefits as favorable terms of trade reduced relative input prices and boosted profitability. Although Gordon and his co-authors recognize the potential costs of sustaining a large, globally active military apparatus, these costs are not incorporated in the econometric models supporting the SSA theory. This paper attempts to extend the SSA analysis by empirically measuring the effects of both military spending and military power on U.S. trade performance over the 1951-1987 period. It is shown that while military power and spending commitments may have positive effects on the terms of trade, these military variables had direct and indirect negative impacts on the U.S. net export balance and therefore domestic aggregate demand. In the context of a model of U.S. growth performance open to international transactions, the overall effect of the postwar military system on U.S. economic growth was likely negative in the cold-war era.