The Cost of Opposition: Harming our Own Rather than Helping our Opponent

Abstract

Would you prefer to harm your own group or aid an opposing group? Across polarized issues (political party, abortion access, and gun control; N = 2,214), participants given this lose-lose choice prefer to harm their own side of a cause rather than aid the opposition. Our findings run counter to a harm-minimizing strategy as individuals generally believe that organizations promoting their side spend their funds more efficiently than opposing organizations. In an incentive-compatible study, we demonstrate that participants are willing to subtract, on average, over three times as much from their side in order to avoid giving $1 to the opposing side. We propose that these decisions are driven by identity concerns: individuals believe that supporting an opposing group is a stronger negative signal of their values than harming their own group. Shifting perceived group norms leads to corresponding behavioral changes, with important implications for compromise and intergroup conflict.