The Cost of Clarity: The Case for a Strict Approach to the Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations

Abstract

In August 2012, the United States Congress directed Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to determine whether the Haqqani organization, a militant faction loosely associated with the Taliban and based in the tribal region of Pakistan, met criteria for designation as a terrorist organization.The Haqqani organization has grown to be the predominate force attacking United States military and Afghan civilians in the years since the US-led invasion of Afghanistan and toppling of the Taliban regime. The issue now forced by Congress has drawn a line in the sand between two distinct camps in United States foreign policy. Proponents of the designation of the Haqqani network as a foreign terrorist organization argue that this designation is necessary to force Pakistani compliance with targeting the group, and also to achieve secondary effects such as isolating and attacking the economic capabilities and alliances available to the organization. Opponents to the designation cite the risk that the United States runs in alienating powerful opposition elements that have the capability and growing desire to negotiate a lasting peace in the region, expediting to an eventual withdrawal of United States forces. This article, then, argues that a hard line approach to organizations under scrutiny as foreign terrorist entities will best achieve the objective of maintaining international peace and security. In contrast, a softer approach, hedged on aspirations of reconciliation, yields results directly counter, with organizations dedicated to the targeting of United States interests to continue violence free of consequences.Specifically, application of this hard line approach to designation of foreign terrorist organizations will provide a clear line of demarcation for groups targeting United States interests. It will add clarity to the twilight zone that currently exists between when the United States will and will not entertain negotiations with elements seeking concessions adverse to stated United States policy. Part I of this article describes the situation that currently exists in which extremist organizations are able to exploit the gap in US designations of groups as foreign terrorist organizations. In Part II, the article explains how a hard line approach would yield beneficial results when dealing with organizations adverse to US foreign policy goals, exploring the trade in consequences of designating a terrorist organization early and consistently versus later and without fidelity. Finally, Part III, the article demonstrates why early and consistent designation of terrorist organizations furthers international peace and security objectives by eliminating the ability of these organizations to mature into threats of international significance.