The 'correct interpretation' premise in international adjudication

Abstract

An oft-repeated aphorism is that interpretation cannot be reduced to a simple mechanical formula like 1+1=2. Such a statement is delightfully ironic if one considers that Russel and Whitehead devoted more than 300 pages, across two volumes of Principia Mathematica, to prove this 'simple formula'. The aim of this contribution is to examine whether international adjudication functions on the premise of the 'correct interpretation', and whether there are any structural features of the international legal system and of its interpretative rules that bar 'correct interpretation'. The objections to 'correct interpretation' revolve around three main axes: (i) incompleteness of the law, i.e., that 'law runs out'; (ii) that there are and cannot be any rules of interpretation; and (iii) that in order to differentiate between multiple interpretations judges would have to resort to non-legal considerations/tools. Section 2 examines whether there are any systemic issues that are either prohibitive of or facilitative to 'correct interpretation'. This is followed by an examination of the integration/incorporation of prima facie non-legal elements or tools in the interpretative process, especially in the context of evolutive interpretation and the existence of limits of interpretation (Section 3). Section 4 presents the International Law Commission's approach to 'correct interpretation' during the debate on the rules on interpretation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Section 5 tackles the issue of 'permissible interpretations' in international adjudication as an alternative to 'correct interpretation'. Finally, Section 6, building on the previous analysis, addresses the three groups of objections and highlights misconceptions regarding the nature and function of interpretation that may account for these objections.