The Corporate Managers and Stockholders Relationship: The Moral Hazard Issue (in French)

Abstract

This paper deals with the problem of asymmetrical information’s concerning the moral hazard linked with the behavior of corporate managers (leaders). The stockholders (shareholders) can not control ex ante the corporate managers because the action is unobservable and the stockholders can not oblige the corporate managers to choose an action which is effective and benefit both for two parts. The stockholders can’t modify the choice impact of an action taken by the leaders if and only if they decide to condition the utility of action to the observable final result. This problem settles especially in the case of companies listed in the stock exchange of Casablanca because there is some disconnection between the true company value and market stock prices. Indeed, we deal with this problem within the framework of companies listed in the Casablanca Stock Exchange. Our step consisting to show the moral hazard existing between two parts: the stockholders (called “Principal” who is no-informed) and the leader namely the Chief Executive Officer (called “Agent” who is informed).