Abstract
Internationally shared fishery resources account for one third of commercially exploitable marine fishery resources. This paper analyses the economic management of these shared resources, with the aid of case studies; doing so through the lens of game theory. The relevance of the management of these resources to strong individual user rights at the national (entity) level is straightforward. Ineffective management of the resources at the international level will undermine national user rights schemes based upon these resources. The management of different classes of internationally shared fish stocks is threatened by several forms of instability, with the most important of these being shifting and unpredictable zonal attachments, and free riding. Progress is being made, with one of the cases studies showing how a seemingly intractable and devastating problem of free riding, which threatened national user rights based upon the relevant resource with destruction, has been fully overcome.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
