The Constitutional Structures of the National Political Economy: Barrier to or Precondition for European Integration?

Abstract

The Court of Justice of the European Union is increasingly dedicated to the pursuit of economic efficiency. As this article will demonstrate, this has led to diagonal conflict between European legal pronouncements on the free movement of labour within a services regime and national jurisprudence on democratically-legitimated public procurement policies within distinct state aids regimes. Where once the CJEU treated public procurement as a distinctive part of the EU’s state aids regime, or one which might be reconciled with redistributive ethical and social concerns maintained at national level, the application of the EU services regime to procurement has placed this traditional understanding in doubt. This re-alignment, however, as well as the supranational-national conflict that it has created, reflects both the deeper mismatch both between European economic and national social competences, as well as friction between national and European conceptions of constitutional legitimacy. Such tensions must be overcome in order to secure continuing legal integration within Europe.