Abstract

This study aims to address the functioning and cooperation of constitutional bodies in the Republic of Albania. It aims to highlight the often-rigid relationship between them for the establishment of constitutional bodies, especially when this process needs to pass through a spirit of cooperation. More specifically, the paper will refer to the lack of functioning of the Constitutional Court in the Republic of Albania. This lack, without question, has brought a problem in the functioning and consolidation of the rule of law in the Republic of Albania. Although the great constitutional reform of 2016, seemed to undertake through non-political constitutional bodies to solve the problems that are often created through bodies of a political nature, this so far has not yielded the expected results. The opposite has happened, the non-political constitutional body, which has a role in the appointment of judges of the Constitutional Court seems to have further fueled the conflict between the constitutional bodies in this process. The Judicial Appointments Council seemed like a finding in the 2016 constitutional reform, but from a body that would avoid disagreements dictated by the past of co-operation of constitutional institutions, it seems to have done the opposite. Sincere cooperation between constitutional bodies in fulfilling their obligations has been lacking in Albania since the advent of political pluralism in the early 1990s, and this has not been achieved even by bodies created specifically for this purpose. In this way, the conflict between the President of the Republic and the Parliament, although perhaps dictated by political motives, has left the Republic of Albania without a functioning Constitutional Court. This paper aims to analyze that the lack of trust between the constitutional bodies of the Republic of Albania remains an obstacle in consolidating the rule of law in this country. It is also intended to analyze that the non-functioning of the Constitutional Court has brought a number of problems for achieving this goal, even to resolve conflicts between constitutional bodies.
 
 Received: 16 December 2020 / Accepted: 18 February 2021 / Published: 5 March 2021

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