Abstract
In the present paper we discuss the notion of values for games with coalition structure, applying the approach suggested by S. Hart and A. Mas-Colell (1985, “The Potential: A New Approach to the Value in Multi-person Allocation Problems,” Discussion Paper 1157, Harvard Institute for Economic Research) concerning the consistency property and the potential function. An axiomatic formulation of the values by this approach leads to two known values for coalition structure, namely, R. J. Aumann and J. H. Drèze's (1974, Int. J. Game Theory 3, 217–237) value (AD value) and G. Owen's (1977), “Values of Games with Priori Unions,” in Essays in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory (R. Heim and O. Moeschlin, Eds.), New York: Springer-Verlag) value for games with coalition structure.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
