The consequences of timing norms and term limits on local agency

Lucinda David

doi:10.1177/0308518x211049448

Abstract

Incorporating time as a unit of analysis can enrich the study of agency by showing the specific ways in which actors are temporally constrained when responding to economic disturbances. In this paper, this is done by examining how the behavior of actors is affected by timing norms such as term limits that may be associated with an actor's position, as for example, an elected mayor or university vice-chancellor. Institutions such as timing norms and term limits shape, constrain, and enable actors in their efforts to persuade others to mobilize resources toward collective action and institutional change in regions. This paper shows the value of considering timing norms in the study of agency, by presenting a comparative case study of local actors’ responses to the closure of large research and development facilities in two cities in Sweden. Main findings from interview material and supporting documents show that the possibility to renew term limits shape how actors pursue policy initiatives. These initiatives are found to be in sync with the term limits of these actors, particularly in the schedules of policy milestones and operations. However, this paper also finds that actors actively shape these temporal constructs in order to convince other actors to support collective action efforts. This paper contributes to a more time conscious account of agency, with its cases pointing to the importance of investigating institutions with temporal dimensions that help explain how agentic processes are carried out.

Highlights

Economic geography has a rich tradition in studying time (Hägerstrand, 1970) and ingraining it in its theoretical and empirical body of work (Henning, 2019), it has not been examined very much at the level of institutional and political actors
This paper aims to demonstrate the value of examining time as a setting for agentic processes and time as temporal institutions with which actors actively engage
This section provides a background on the closures and actors associated with the cases of Lund and Södertälje. This is followed by a discussion of the results for the three propositions and involves comparisons of Lund and Södertälje, in terms of how their respective actors responded to their term limits and timing norms, and if and how they enacted strategies of layering and temporal layering

Summary

Introduction

Economic geography has a rich tradition in studying time (Hägerstrand, 1970) and ingraining it in its theoretical and empirical body of work (Henning, 2019), it has not been examined very much at the level of institutional and political actors. In the Lund case, it was the vice-chancellor and the chairperson of the board from Lund University, who took the lead in responding to the issue They initiated and orchestrated the eventual purchase of the facility through a coalition of actors, involving partners such as the foundation of Mats Paulsson, philanthropist and founder of a large construction firm called PEAB, as well as Region Skåne, the regional government. The political leadership in Södertälje worked with Scania, a large manufacturing firm founded in the region over a century ago, to enable and facilitate the sale and development of the former AstraZeneca facility to a consortium called Acturum, a joint venture between the acquisition arms of the philanthropic organization of the Wallenberg Foundation, and PEAB. It involves more partners and with further support from the Ministry of Education from the national government

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