The consequences of accession: the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption’s Impact on Children’s Rights

Abstract

Do states join human rights treaties if they know that non-compliance can have tangible consequences? We contend that states are less likely to accede to such treaties, especially if they have an outside option. We investigate this in the context of accession to the Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-Operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (or: Hague Convention), which regulates the adoption of children across borders. We theorize that the incentive to join the treaty is structured by the salience of, and likelihood of participation in, intercountry adoption: states with larger orphan populations should prefer the outside option, whereas the presence and pressure children’s rights NGOs should prompt states to join the convention. We employ new data on the presence of children’s rights NGOs and a Cox proportional hazards technique. We find support for our propositions, with a caveat: states with large orphan populations initially prefer to the outside option, but become more likely to join the convention over time. This suggests that NGOs can influence states to join treaties that have consequences—especially if they assist with the development of administrative infrastructure that meets treaty requirements.