The Consequence Argument and an Ontology of Dispositions

Abstract

AbstractIn this paper I discuss naturalistic, transcendentalist and ethical approaches to the problem of free will. After a brief introduction to the libertarian/compatibilist debate, I show in what sense the notion of determinism and indeterminism on which it is based presupposes a philosophical position on the nature of laws of nature. After introducing van Inwagen’s consequent argument, I argue that Humean attempt to solve it fails it because the humean approach to laws is untenable and because the laws of nature do not depend on us in the sense advocated by humeans. In the last part of the paper, I claim that and ontology of dispositions opens the way to what is most important in human freedom, namely the ability to act in a certain way as in virtue centered morality, and in the capability approach already defended by Sen and Nussbaum.KeywordsDeterminismIndeterminismLibertarian compatibilistConsequent argumentHumean compatibilismDispositional free will