The Consciousness of Succession

Abstract

For all its subtle differences, Husserl scholarship on time-consciousness has reached a consensus that Husserl's theory underwent a significant interpretive improvement starting around 1908/1909. On this advance, which concerned the intentional structure and directedness of absolute consciousness, I have cautioned against reading Augustine's theory of time as a philosophical predecessor to Husserl's. In a recent confrontation with my efforts, Roger Wasserman tried to defend a reading of Augustine's influence on Husserl's theory of time by criticizing my reading of Augustine and Husserl. This reply to Wasserman's challenge (i) reestablishes my reservations about attempts to claim a relation between Augustine and Husserl on time-consciousness, (ii) defends the standard interpretation of the development of Husserl's theory of time-consciousness, and (iii) raises several critical questions about Wasserman's Neoplatonic or Augustinian reading of Husserl on time-consciousness.