Abstract
In this paper I demonstrate that connectionism is, or can be, largely in line with most recent trends in cognitive science. The core of my argument is a distinction of several types or uses of representation in cognitive science. I demonstrate how connectionism helps in abandoning one of these types—the notion that representation is a mirror of an objectively existent world—while maintaining the important other two types—causal correlates of physical states, and internal mental states standing in for past perceptions. With this distinction the question “Does representation need reality?” can be answered. I further depict a connectionist route to embodied and situated cognitive models, as they are put forward by recent cognitive theories. After a short discussion of connectionism’s role for dynamicist theories of cognition, I conclude that much of current connectionist research is highly relevant to modern cognitive science, even if the models are apparently remote from truly embodied or situated ones.
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