The Congressional Veto: Shifting the Balance of Administrative Control

Abstract

During the past decade, hundreds of provisions have been enacted by Congress giving that body some form of control over the projects and regulations of federal agencies. Pressures for more far-reaching measures of this sort, including a proposal to vest Congress with a veto of all regulations promulagated by federal agencies, have intensified debate on both the constitutional merits and administrative wisdom of the congressional veto process. These measures are exerting considerable effect, delaying the decisions of the agencies, reshaping the regulatory process, and increasing the direct congressional role in setting administrative agendas and substantive policies. The result is a transfer of administrative power to the more than 200 standing committees and subcommittees of the Congress-and, significantly, to their staffs. This transfer has served to impede the executive chain of command, to diminish the role of independent regulatory agencies as experts in their respective fields, to devalue judicial review of agency action, and to reduce the accountability of the affected agencies.