The confusions of democracy: The Arab spring and beyond

Abstract

Celebration of democracy makes it politically difficult to extend development assistance to poor countries for fear of appearing to support non-democratic regimes. Unfortunately, there is little evidence that democracy fosters economic development. Democracy is insufficient in the absence of instrumental transmissions mechanisms that are capable of reciprocating the “upward” expression of livelihood aspirations back “down” to households so that life prospects might improve. Most developing countries—regardless of their political attributes—lack such transmission mechanisms. The Arab Spring revolts of 2010–11 have been hailed as popular demands for democracy. The empirical evidence from two econometric specifications—Logit and a Linear Probability Model—fail to support that claim. Rather, general anger and frustration at defective life prospects—high unemployment, delayed marriage, reduced population growth, high inflation, and low economic growth—are revealed as highly statistically significant reasons for the revolts. Five countries experiencing revolts—Egypt, Libya, Stria, Tunisia, and Yemen—all showed trajectories of increasing alienation in the decade leading up to 2010. The international donor community must find a way to support economic development in regimes that lack the full complement of democratic ideals. Otherwise, defective livelihoods will continue to spawn political revolts.