The Confrontation between Iraq and the US: Implications for the Theory and Practice of Deterrence

Abstract

The American confrontation with Iraq poses important questions for scholarship as well as policy, and many of these involve whether various forms of deterrence can be effective. Our theories in this area tend to be simultaneously descriptive and prescriptive, which complicates analysis of policies with which we disagree. The Bush administration's policy is driven in large measure by the belief that deterrence against a nuclear-armed Iraq would fail. This implies that Iraq could deter American attempts to protect its allies and interests in the region. The administration's policy thus affirms as well as denies the centrality of deterrence. Given the enormous preponderance of power that America enjoys and its manifest interests in the region, the administration position is odd. Saddam's previous behavior does not indicate that he is undeterrable. In fact, the US does seem to be relying on deterrence to decrease the likelihood that Iraq would use weapons of mass destruction if the US invades. The administration's endorsement of defense and preventive war may partly be explained by its ambitious broader foreign policy goals.