The conflict within: the politics of parliamentary election management in Iran

Abstract

ABSTRACT Scholars of comparative politics have long been interested in understanding conflicts that arise among elites within authoritarian contexts. Such conflicts are particularly puzzling when they occur in the context of authoritarian elections and within state administrative institutions like the electoral management body (EMB). Using previously unanalysed primary sources provided by Iran’s Ministry of Interior, which document the inner workings of Iran’s 2000 parliamentary election management, this study investigates intra-elite conflict associated with this important election. I found that within the dual EMB structure, where elected and unelected members coexist, elected administrative members can access information on irregular activities by unelected members more than those outside of this body. These information resources encourage elected members to take the risk of accusing more powerful elites – the unelected members of the regime – of electoral fraud. This is particularly evident during the reformist (moderate opposition) Presidency. My findings suggest the importance of examining intra-elite conflict within administrative institutions – EMBs – for a better understanding of political contestation within otherwise opaque authoritarian regimes.