The conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia: lessons we didn’t learn

Abstract

The article examines the violation of the principles of international law, in particular the principles of territorial integrity and inviolability of state borders, on the example of the conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of practical aspects of these principles. The study established the legal significance of the international legal conflict between Russia and Georgia, as well as its impact on the formation of territorial disputes within the Eurasian continent.
 It is emphasized that the conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia cannot be called «humanitarian intervention to help the ethnic population.» The paper confirms that the very fact of the introduction of regular troops into Georgia could already be regarded as an act of aggression. In addition, Russia’s refusal to withdraw peacekeepers from Georgian territory due to violations and thus the impossibility of fulfilling the terms of bilateral agreements can also be interpreted as the occupation of Georgian territory.
 Based on the analysis of regulations in the form of resolutions and bilateral agreements, it was possible to trace the origins and legal basis of this conflict. In fact, the Sochi and Moscow agreements concluded in 1992 and 1994, respectively, legitimized the presence of Russian peacekeeping troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The article also focuses on the use of weapons by Georgia and provides an analysis in the context of Article 51 of the UN Charter. Based on this, the latter should be interpreted as a means of self-defense, which is one of the two legitimate applications of the concept of jus ad bellum in the XXI century.
 The actions, more fair, inaction, of the international community in the process of resolving the conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which as a result influenced the formation of territorial strife and colonialist aspirations on the part of the Russian Federation, are substantiated. It has been suggested that the reluctance of world leaders and international organizations to take decisive action to resolve the Russian-Georgian war has become a catalyst for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and in 2022 as well.