The Conditions of Possibility of Scientific Experience: Cassirer’s Interpretation of the Theory of Relativity

Abstract

The following paper will examine Cassirer’s interpretation of the theory of relativity. The main philosophical question which has to be asked is the following: is the transcendental constitution of space and time still valid in order to describe the real constitution of scientific experience? Must the results of special and general relativity necessarily negate the old Kantian structure? Einstein’s theory should indeed be conceived as a general reformulation of the conditions of possibility of scientific experience on the basis of a new metrology, which seems to contrast Kant’s own point of view, primarily when we consider the fact that the determination of those conditions as such exclusively pertains to physics, when, as is well known, they are conceived of by Kant and his scholars as intellectual functions. Accordingly, if we say Einstein is entirely right, the risk will consist of completely misjudging transcendental Leistung, which, moreover, would be declared completely superfluous in determining experience. Cassirer’s interpretation is quite clear on the latter point: the theory of relativity falls on the ground of transcendental philosophy, since the preliminary physical determination must be prefaced with an analysis of the judgements we use to express the main physical notions, for instance, the famous ‘simultaneity’: even if the physical definition of simultaneity must be established solely in the field of physics, considering the limitations implied by the speed of light, a preliminary assumption regarding the concept of a “normal” definition of simultaneity is required, which depends upon some invariable functions of the intellect. Through this interpretation, and notwithstanding the endorsement of the empirical side of relativity, the priority of a pure transcendental moment against the first stratum of a physical determination must be upheld. In arguing the renewed necessity of this quite standard transcendental approach, I will try a peculiar comparison between Cassirer’s point of view and two of the most important theories of experience of the 20th century, viz. Husserl’s theory of Lebenswelt and the description of experimental reality attempted by the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics.