The Conditional Effect of Violence as a Political Tactic: Mass Insurgency, Welfare Generosity, and Electoral Context in the American States

Abstract

Theory: Political elites, in their efforts to exercise social control while maintaining legitimacy, respond to civil unrest by expanding the relief rolls. This response is not guaranteed, however, and is highly dependent upon the numerical strength of the insurgent group, access to democratic electoral institutions, and the relationship between the insurgent group and the rest of society. Hypotheses: The theory is tested by examining the impact of black insurgency in the United States on AFDC growth. In the absence of effective black electoral access, if insurgency has any impact at all, it should be weakest where white resistence is strong. In the presence of effective electoral access, insurgency will have a positive effect on AFDC growth, and will be most effective where white resistance is weak, or where black electoral power is strong. Methods: Pooled time-series analysis is used to examine growth in state AFDC recipient rates during the years 1962-80. Results: The results provide strong evidence that political violence can bring important benefits to insurgent groups in the United States. Benefits are not guaranteed, however, and appear to be contingent upon the hypothesized contextual variables. In the case of the United States, these variables appear to have interacted in a complex fashion to produce a rather unexpected outcome. Political violence was most effective in the areas where white resistance was strongest, due to the dominance of black electoral power, and where black electoral power was weakest, due to a more tolerant white electorate.