The Concepts of Truth and Knowledge in Psychologism

Abstract

Although virtually no one now holds psychologism in its original, nineteenth-century form, I shall argue that there are current views that are psychologistic in very important respects. In this paper I want to consider the concepts of truth and knowledge as they figure in those theories. I shall further argue that psychologistic views involve subjective conceptions of truth and knowledge that are inconsistent with the prima facie correct understanding of these notions. Much anti-realism in fields like ethics is due to relativist conceptions of truth. Indeed, in its most radical form, the one with which I shall be principally concerned, psychologism is now the view called ‘cultural relativism.’ Although I see much of merit in psychologism and even cultural relativism, I conclude by arguing that a completely psychologistic understanding of human knowledge and belief would take us too far in the direction of subjectivism. What I value in psychologistic views is that they have acted as a continuing restraint upon uncritical idealism. Indeed, psychologism originated in the nineteenth century, the century of idealism, as a theory about the nature of philosophical thought. According to nineteenth-century psychologism, philosophy is a branch of empirical psychology. This means that philosophical truths are essentially truths about how our minds work. The argument for this claim is based on the belief that the methodology of philosophy is essentially introspective, but the fact that philosophy employs an introspective methodology does not by itself imply that its results are facts of empirical psychology. Indeed, Kantians maintain that the methodology of philosophy is essentially introspective, but insist that at least some of its results are a priori and hence not facts of empirical psychology. Nonetheless, early psychologism claimed that the fact that the method of philosophy is introspective made it properly a subject of