The Concept of Worldly Beatitude in the Writings of Thomas Aquinas

Abstract

The Concept of Worldly Beatitude in the Writings of Thomas Aquinas ANTHONY J. CELANO MUCH HAS BEEN MADE OF Thomas Aquinas' use of the distinction between perfect and imperfect beatitude in his commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics (EN=Ethica Nicomachea) of Aristotle. Modern scholars, most notably R.-A. Gauthier and P. Mercken, view Thomas' notion of "beatitudo imperfecta" as an indication of Thomas' "transformation" of the ethics of Aristotle.' They argue further that because of this transformation, Thomas' commentary on the EN is a defective work and of little help in understanding Aristotle's intention in his great treatise on moral philosophy. In examining the claims of modern scholars we shall focus on two different, though related, problems in the work of Thomas Aquinas: the concept of "beatitudo imperfecta," which signifies Thomas' concept of worldly beatitude and the modern assertion of a Thomistic transformation of Aristotelian ethics. Thomas' own notion of worldly beatitude arises from his reading of the tenth and eleventh chapters of the first book of the EN where Aristotle resolves the problem of the effects of chance on the human good, which is called eudaimonia (felicitas or happiness). In this discussion Aristotle implies a distinction between the essential nature of happiness, which consists in the ' R.-A. Gauthier's introductions to both the L'Ethique ~ Nicomaque, tr. and comm. by R.-A. Gauthier and Y. Jolif (Louvain, 197o), 131 and the Leonine edition of the Sententia libriEthicorum (hereafter SLE) in S. Thomae de Aquino Operaomnia (Rome, 1969),47: ~35"-57" contain his judgment on the commentary of Thomas. See also P. Mercken, "Transformation of the Ethics of Aristotle in the Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas," Tommaso d'Aquino nel suo settimo centenario,Atti del CongressoInternazionale (Rome, Naples; April 1974),5: a51-56; B. Mondin, "II fine naturale della vita humana, quale fondamento ultimo della morale nel Commento alle Sentenze di San Tommaso d'Aquino," Sapienza 28 (1975): 385-9~. [215] 216 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 25:2 APRIL 1987 exercise of both intellectual and moral virtue, and a state of blessedness, which is characterized by the benefits of good fortune, enhancing the life of virtue. In Aristotelian terms, to makarion (beatitude or blessedness) encompasses eudaimonia, in that it refers to a state of happiness marked by an abundance of external goods.' The crucial text for understanding the medieval interpretation of the concept of worldly beatitude occurs when Aristotle concludes his discussion of the effects of chance on the human good with the phrase: makar/ous d'anthr6pous. ~ The Latin rendering of these words as "beatos ut homines" led Thomas and many of his contemporaries to speculate on the exact meaning of human beatitude, as understood by Aristotle. When they read these words they saw the clearest expression of the distinction made by Aristotle between the essential constituent of happiness and the life of blessedness, which is, to some extent, dependent upon good fortune. Thomas understood Aristotle to have raised the question of earthly beatitude in the course of his discussion on the role of chance in the production of human happiness. Indeed, the entire question of the effects of chance on the human good is raised during Aristotle's resolution of a much broader problem: the cause of human happiness. Thomas notes that Aristotle offers three possible solutions to the question on the origin of happiness: a gift from the gods, the product of human endeavors, or the result of good fortune.4 Thomas, as a Christian, cannot exclude divine causality from his own resolution of this problem, but asserts correctly that Aristotle emphasizes the actions of man in bringing about his own happiness. Thomas concludes that man cooperates with God in causing happiness.5 Thomas, like Aristotle, realizes that fate does have some role to play in human lives, for human actions can be severely influenced by the unpredictable turns of fortune's wheel, and happiness may somehow be adversely affected by many terrible misfortunes. Thomas, however, views the role of chance as having only a limited influence on the human good. Happiness itself, Thomas argues, cannot arise from good fortune, because it results from virtuous human actions; chance affects only the attainment of...