The Concept of Variability among the Secondary Precepts of Natural Law

Abstract

As we noted in our opening chapter, there was considerable difference of opinion over the kind of variability which could be attributed to natural law. Before analysing the different forms of variability, it is necessary that we state in very general terms what we mean by this word. While we will, in the course of our discussion, be interested in any form of variability which may be relevant to natural law, it is the following kind which will interest us most. We wish to discover whether a certain precept may on one occasion be in accord with natural law and yet not be so on another occasion. In other words, we are asking whether it could ever be correct to say of a certain action X (defined by precept a) that to have performed it in the past (perhaps ten years or perhaps a century before) would have been to act in accordance with natural law, but to perform it at this moment would be contrary to natural law. This we submit is a field of investigation which has never been adequately considered. In our opening chapter we saw that very few writers were in complete agreement as to what form of variability could be attributed to natural law. It is the nature of the variability that we hope to clarify in this present chapter. Here and there we will give examples to illustrate a particular point, but these must be regarded as incidental to our main discussion. What we are interested in is not so much which precepts of natural law may be regarded as variable, but rather, whether it is meaningful to speak of variability at all, and (if it is) to ascertain the reasons why such variability may occur.